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NOTE

HABEAS CORPUS: JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS

[The Great Writ] is not now and never has
narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown
grand purpose-the protection of individuals against
right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their

been a static,
to achieve its
erosion of their
liberty.

Jones v. Cunningham
371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)
(Black, J., Opinion of the Court)
INTRODUCTION
At one time, the writ of habeas corpus was a device whereby
a court could inquire only into the physical restraint imposed by
a court without jurisdiction or by an executive acting ultra vires.
The scope of federal habeas corpus has now been greatly expanded,
however, with the growth of the Fourteenth Amendment due process
doctrines pursuant to the application of selected amendments of
the Bill of Rights against the states, to review large parts of
a state's criminal process. Today, the writ serves as a readily
available avenue for collateral attack on constitutional defects in
state criminal convictions where there is reason to believe that
the initial conviction did not fairly protect individual interests. 1
However, there is some doubt as to whether or not the writ
is as available as one might think to provide complete and adequate
relief despite the recent expansion of the importance of the writ.
In multiple-sentence situations the petitioner may seek to attack
future sentences with the writ of habeas corpus. Such access to
the courts may be limited to a particular court because of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Title 28 §2241 of the United
States Code which contains statutes providing for the federal writ
1. Development, in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HIAv. L. REv. 1038, 1040-41
(1970).
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of habeas corpus. The likely result is that the petitioner's relief
may also be limited. The precise problem is whether the federal
district court in the district of confinement or the federal district
court in the district of conviction should have jurisdiction to hear
habeas corpus petitions in cases of multi-state sentencing or mixed
federal-state sentencing where the future unserved sentence has
been imposed by a different jurisdiction.
HISTORY
The exact origin of the writ of habeas corpus is not known
but within a century after the victory by William in 1066, the
writ was in general use in England. 2 The early function of the
writ was simply to get a reluctant party, such as a defaulting
defendant, into court in order that justice could be done.8 In
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the writ became a weapon
in the power struggle among the courts. The common-law courts,
in inter-court competition with inferior courts and other central
courts, protected and expanded their jurisdiction by suing the writ
to release persons held in,custody by the other courts. 4 Early
in the seventeenth century, according to Meador,
[T~he writ of habeas corpus had evolved into an independent writ, not auxiliary to any other proceeding. It was
a device whereby a court could inquire into the legality of
detention and could order a discharge if the detention was
found illegal. The writ has also become differentiated into
several new forms. For constitutional history the most important was habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, used where the
petitioner was held under a criminal- charge.5
The words habeas corpus when used singly have been understood to refer to the common law writ of habeas corpus, ad subjiciendum which was generally termed the "Great Writ" -and it
was in this sense that it was used in the United States Constitution.6
The British Parliament in 1679 passed the Habeas Corpus Act
to remedy abuses by the King but- the Act specifically excluded
persons detained because of a criminal conviction, leaving such
7
prisoners to resort to habeas corpus as developed at common law.
The colonists in America laid claim to the writ of habeas
corpus as a common law right of Englishmen probably because
of tradition and the use of Coke's Institutes and Blackstone's Corn2.
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mentaries as the basic legal treatises in the colonies. 8 Until 1787,
the writ of habeas corpus was mentioned in fewer than half of
the State constitutions probably because the writ had become so
well established; however, following ratification of the United States
Constitution, which dealt with habeas corpus in the suspension clause,
nearly all the States copied the federal provision in their constitutions. 9 The suspension clause as set forth in the United States
Constitution is: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion
the public safety may require it."' 10 Although the suspension clause
does not affirmatively authorize issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, it has been suggested that the right to the writ is grounded
in the clause, independent of any statute."' The Supreme Court
in Jones v. Cunningham12 stated that the suspension clause 'was
the constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be made
available.
The first Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 which authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners
in custody under authority of the United States. 3 Thus, the writ
was available in the federal courts only for inquiry into federal
detention. This limitation remained until the Act of 1867 was passed
extending the reach of the writ to prisoners in state custody. 14
The growth of the writ following the Act of 1867 to its present
scope is summarized by Meador in three main developments of
constitutional law in the use of the writ by federal courts: (1) "the
15
extension of the federal writ to persons held in state custody";
(2) "the gradual enlargement of the court's scope of inquiry into
legality where confinement is under a final judgment of conviction;" 16 (3) "enlargement in the meaning given 'due process of
1
law' and 'equal protection of the laws' in criminal proceedings."' 1
JURISDICTION
The right of the writ of habeas corpus is implemented by
a number of federal statutes. The basic statute setting forth jurisdiction states: "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any
circuit judge within their respective jurisdiction . .
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

1d. at 30.
Id. at 32.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
R. SoKoL, FEDERAL HABEAS

CORPUS 17 (2d ed. 1969).
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963).
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
Act of 1867, ch. 28, § I, 14 S t. 385 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
D. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CHARTA 55 (1966).
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. 2241(a) (1964).

(1964)).
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The question whether the words "within their respective jurisdiction" limit a district court's power to grant a writ of habeas
corpus to petitioners detained within its territorial jurisdiction was
presented in Ahrens v. Clark, 19 in 1948. In that case aliens were
detained at Ellis Island, New York and sought to challenge by
habeas corpus the legality of their detention in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. Respondent moved to dismiss because
petitioners were not confined in the District of Columbia. The District
Court granted the motion and the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia dismissed on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that a district court is limited in its power to issue writs
of habeas corpus to persons confined within its territorial jurisdiction.20
The Court based its decision upon what it regarded as the
prevailing practice in the lower federal courts and cited eleven
21
cases as a general view that their jurisdiction is so confined.
Yet, a review of the cases is inconclusive as to any common
view.2 2 The Court also relied upon the legislative history of the
statute and what it regarded as the clear meaning of the phrase
"within their respective jurisdiction. ' 23 However, it cannot be said
that the language is clear for it does not purport to define jurisdiction literally in terms of the presence of the petitioner or for
that matter, the presence of the custodian.2 4 As such, it is not
clear whether it is the petitioner, the respondent or both who
must be within the jurisdiction. An interpretation more in line
with the historical habeas corpus concept would require only the
presence of the respondent who has custody of the petitioner to
be within reach of district process. 25 Historically, the writ has
been directed toward the jailer.2 6 However, the lower federal courts
the jurissubsequently have required the petitioner to be within
27
diction of the respective district court, citing Ahrens.
In a parallel development, practical problems had evolved prior
to 1948 in the administration of federal habeas corpus.2 8 Prior
to 1867, the common law concerning habeas corpus was that a
conviction imposed by a court of general criminal jurisdiction was
prima facie evidence that the confinement was legal. In 1867, Con19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ahrens v. Clark, 835 U.S. 188 (1948).
Id. at 192.
Id . at 190.
83 HAv. L. REv. supra note 1, at 1162, n. 49.
335 U.S. at 191-2.
Id. at 201 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 306 (1944).

26.

D.

MEADOR,

HABEAS

CORPUS AND MAGNA

CHARTA 7

(1966).

See

323 U.S.

at 306

ofting In re Jackson, 15 Misc. 417, 439-40.
27. See, e.g., Hart v. Ohio Bureau of Probation and Parole, 290 F.2d 550, (6th Cir.
1961)
Windisch v. United States, 295 F.2d 528 (1st Cir. 1961) ; Allen v. United States,
327 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1964); Booker v. Arkansas, 380 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1967).
28. R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 178 (2d ed. 1969).
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gress changed the common law rule by extending the writ of
habeas corpus to all cases where a person may be in custody
in violation of the Constitution and provided for inquiry into the
causes for detention.2 9 As a result of these developments in the
law there was a great increase eventually in the number of habeas
corpus petitions filed in federal courts by state and federal prisoners.3 0 Since the prisoners had to make application for habeas
corpus in the district of confinement,3 1 those districts in which
federal penal institutions were located were overburdened with petitions.3 2 In addition, some habeas corpus petitions raised questions
of fact that could only be resolved by a hearing requiring the
presence of officials, witnesses and records, all of which could
be located some distance away.32 Thus, to reduce these administrative difficulties, Congress in 1948 modified the Judicial Code
to provide federal prisoners a statutory post-conviction remedy,
this was 28 U.S.C. §2255, 34 which requires prisoners to seek relief
in the court of conviction by applying by motion to vacate the
judgment.
In United States v. Haymen,3 5 the Supreme Court rejected
arguments that the statute was an unconstitutional suspension of
the writ and held that Section 2255 provided federal prisoners with
a remedy equivalent to habeas corpus while correcting problems
which had arisen in the administration of the writ.3 6 As provided
by statute, in the event Section 2255 procedure is "inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention," a federal court
in the district of confinement may entertain a petition for habeas
corpus.3 7 Nevertheless some courts refused to hear certain questions
in Section 2255 proceedings.3 8 The Supreme Court in Kaufman v.
United States 9 set the record straight and made it clear that
all constitutional questions could be heard in a Section 2255 pro40
ceeding.
The prematurity rule was established by the Supreme Court
in McNally v. Hill in 1934. 41 The Court refused to grant relief
on habeas corpus to a prisoner attacking a consecutive sentence
he had not yet begun to serve. After determining that the common
29.
behind
30.
31.
82.
83.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
search
39.
40.
41.

United States v. Haymen, 342 U.S. 205, 211 (1952). The case includes a history
the enactment of section 2255.
Id. at 212.
885 U.S. at 188.
842 U.S. at 214.
Walker V. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
The full text of this provision is Included In the appendix.
342 U.S. 205 (1952).
Id. at 219.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1963) (Illegal arrest and illegal
and seizure).
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
Id. at 228.
McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 181 (1934).
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law use of the writ was to enforce a right to immediate release
from custody42 and that the statute empowering the use of the
48
writ did not indicate a legislative intent to broaden that relief,
issuance of the writ was authorized only to inquire into the cause
of a present restraint of liberty.- A petition asserting the right
to be released in the future was thus said to be premature.
45
The fall of the prematurity rule of McNay in Peyton v. Rowe
became the primary basis for territorial jurisdiction problems of
district courts by allowing prisoners to attack collaterally sentences
that would become operative in the future. The Supreme Court
held that "a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is 'in custody'
under any one of them for the purposes of section 2241 (c) (3).,,46
The Court was persuaded by the common usage of custody to
describe the total time imprisoned and by the fact that the sentences would be lumped together for parole purposes. The prematurity rule of McNally was rejected on the grounds that an application of McNally in the context of Peyton would be at odds
with a principal purpose of the writ which "is to provide for
swift, judicial review of alleged unlawful restraints on liberty. 4 7
Since the factual hearing would not take place until the consecutive
sentence was being served, memories and records would be stale,
lessening the possibility of resolution of constitutional claims. 48 The
Court also rejected immediate release from custody as the only
remedy available in a habeas corpus proceeding. Its rejection was
based upon the statute which does not deny the courts to fashion
other appropriate relief 49 and by subsquent decisions which did
allow such other relief. 50
Thus Peyton, although only concerned with consecutive sentences imposed by the same jurisdiction, allowed a new class of
habeas corpus petitioners to appear, viz., those that seek to challenge
a restraint to be imposed at a later date by another jurisdiction.
It is this group of petitioners that is faced with the possibility
of less than adequate relief in habeas corpus proceedings because
of the territorial jurisdiction limits set by Ahrens.
POST-CONVICTION REVIEW
Whether the district court in the district of confinement or
42. Id. at 138.
43. Rev. Stat. § 753 (1874), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1964).
44...293 U.S. at 138.
45. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
46. Id. at 67.
47. Id at 63.
48. Id. at 62.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964).
50. Ex parte Rull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1968);
Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968).
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the district court in the district of -conviction is the proper forum
depends upon a balancing of conflicting interests. The rule of Ahrens
requires that a federal or state prisoner faced with a future state
sentence in another jurisdiction petition the district of confinement. 1
In both cases, records, officials and witnesses would have to be
transported to the district of confinement for a factual hearing.
To do otherwise it is argued would result in greater administrative
inconvenience with the transporting of a federal or state prisoner
to the district of conviction in the sentencing state.5 2 The argument
cuts both ways. Is it not also a heavy administrative inconvenience
to require the sentencing state in either case to transport records,
officials, or witnesses to the district of confinement? The sentencing
state has a primary interest in defending its conviction and sentence
but it should not be required to defend its action in the federal
district courts in the other forty-nine states. It would seem to be
win the. best interests of justice and administrative convenience to
simply transport the prisoner to the district of conviction. Congress
has .made it clear that convenience lies in favor of the court
in the district of conviction for both federal prisoners" and state
prisoners.5 4 Thus, it would seem that the balance would be in
favor of the district of conviction.
As a result of Peyton, there are many multiple sentence combinations now open to attack by post-conviction review. The different
federal and state sentence combinations and the avenues for postconviction review available to each will be delineated and set forth
*below-in order to fully understand which combinations are trouble-

some.
A. The State Prisoner - Adequate State Post-Conviction Hearing
Acts. Such acts allow the state prisoner to petition the state court
that convicted him for a hearing on claims of denial of state
or federal constitutional rights and ask the court to vacate or
set aside the sentence based upon said denial. The acts provide
'for appeal to the State Supreme Court. 55 North Dakota adopted
the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, as amended, in 1969.51
'The' statute provides that the application shall be filed with the
clerk -of court in which the conviction took place. 57 The statute
also provides for a hearing 58 and review by the Supreme Court
51. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
52. Id. at 191.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1966). This section provides for interstate transfer of an application for writ of habeas corpus. The ability to attack future sentences and the interstate transfer of applications was not known until Peyton v. Rowe in 1968.
55. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) for discussion of Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. North Dakota is one of eight states adopting the Act as of 1969.
:56. N.D. CENT. COD, ch. 29-32 (Supp. 1969).
57. N.D. CENT. COD, § 29-32-03 (Supp. 1969).
58. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 29-32-07 (Supp. 1969).
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of North Dakota. 51 The exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§2254 (b) requires a petitioner to exhaust his state remedies before
resorting to federal habeas corpus.60
B.

The State Prisoner-Federal Habeas Corpus.

1. Collateral attack on in-state sentences, present and future: Where the states do not provide adequate post-conviction
hearings or where petitioner has exhausted his state remedies,
a petitioner in state custody pursuant to a judgment of a state
court may file his petition for habeas corpus in either (a) the
district court in the district of confinement, or (b) in the district
court in the district of conviction. Section 2241 (d) provides for
intrastate transfer between the two districts of the application for
the writ. These two courts have concurrent jurisdiction and one
court may "in the exercise of its discretion and in the furtherance
of justice" transfer a petition to the other for hearing. 61 Service
of process presents no problem intrastate.
2. Collateral attack on out-of-state detainer 2 and future
sentence: A petitioner in state custody attempting to vacate an
out-of-state detainer or future sentence should seek a forum in
the state of conviction in order to achieve complete relief. Because
of the question of application of the Ahrens rule to territorial
jurisdiction, the availability of a complete remedy depends on
whether the federal district court in the sentencing state would
follow Ahrens or a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
that abrogates Ahrens. 3 Petitioner would file his application for
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (1). A state prisoner
with a future federal sentence is in custody for the purposes of
Section 2241 (c) (3) and may file a petition under Section 2255 to
64
challenge that future restraint as a federal prisoner.
C.

The Federal Prisoner

1. Collateral attack on present and future federal sentences-Section 2255 proceeding: A petitioner in federal custody
seeking post-conviction relief under Section 2255 "may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct
the sentence." 65 In such a motion, the respondent will always
59. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 29-32-09 (Supp. 1969).
60. This provision is included in the Appendix.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1964).
62. "A detainer is a writ or instrument authorizing a Jailer to hold a prisoner on behalf of the state that issued it. At the completion of his sentence to one state, the prisoner will be turned over to the state which lodged the detainer against him." 88 Hhxv.
L. Rzv. supra note 1, at 1164, n. 57.
63. Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969).
64. Desmond v. United States Bd. of Parole, 397 F.2d 386 (let Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 919 (1968).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2265 (1964).
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be the United States. Section 2255 provides that the motion for
relief may be made at any time.
2. Collateral attack on out-of-state detainer and future sentence-Federal habeas corpus: Section 2255 applies only to federal
prisoners under federal custody. 6 A petitioner in federal custody
attempting to vacate an out-of-state detainer or future sentence
does so as a state prisoner and would be required to exhaust
the state post-conviction remedies if any as required by section
2254 (b) before resorting to federal habeas corpus.6 7 Otherwise, petitioner would make application for the writ of habeas corpus in
the federal district court in the sentencing state to achieve complete
relief. Again, the availability of an adequate remedy depends upon
whether that district court would follow Ahrens or a decision by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that abrogates Ahrens.68 Petitioner would file his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241 (a).
Thus, while post-conviction review provides adequate relief in
most sentencing situations, there is still the question of whether
or not a petitioner would be able to secure adequate relief in
two important sentencing combinations, namely, a state prisoner
and a federal prisoner petitioning for habeas corpus for collateral
attack on out-of-state detainer and future sentence. In the following
analysis, it will be demonstrated how the courts have handled
these two sentence aggregations in an endeavor to promote justice
and conclude that the proper forum is in the district of conviction
in the sentencing state and that adequate relief may thereby be
achieved.
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON OUT-OF-STATE DETAINER
AND FUTURE SENTENCE
A. A state prisoner petitioning for habeas corpus for collateral
attack on out-of-state detainer and future sentence.
In Word v. North Carolina,69 prisoners Word, Matthews and

Williams were serving sentences imposed by the State of Virginia.
During the course of confinement in Virginia, each was delivered
to North Carolina to stand trial for another offense, convicted,
sentenced and returned to Virginia to complete the remainder of
his sentence. North Carolina lodged a detainer with the Virginia
authorities against each of the prisoners.
The prisoners sought habeas corpus relief to challenge the constitutionality of the North Carolina sentences. Williams sought relief
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Lewis v. New Mexico, 423 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1970). See appendix for § 2241(d).
United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2nd Cir. 1970).
406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969).
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in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, while Word and Matthews brought their actions
in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The prisoners' petitions were dismissed by the respective district courts in which they were filed. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that (1) federal
habeas corpus did provide a present remedy for the state prisoners
in light of the Supreme Court's affirmance of Peyton and (2) that
the proper forum would be the district within the state where
a proper respondent would be available, i.e., the sentencing court.
As a result, the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of two petitions
by the Virginia district court and vacated the dismissal of Williams'
petition and remanded to the North Carolina district court for
further proceedings."0
The possibility that a habeas corpus petition could be brought
by a state prisoner to challenge a future sentence of a foreign
71
state has existed only since the decision of Peyton v. Rowe.
But in Peyton, the Supreme Court was dealing with consecutive
7 2
To extend Peyton to prissentences imposed by the same court.
in another state
sentences
oners attacking detainers and unserved
the Fourth Circuit attempted to tie the detainer and the proper
North Carolina respondent with the peitioner's immediate confinement by adopting the "dual authority" fiction." The Court reasoned
that since the detainer had sufficient adverse affect on petitioner's
current imprisonment because of the effect on his present nature
of confinement and later parole, the petitioner could be considered
to be in custody under the future sentences. Because of the impact
of the detainer on the level of custody in which the petitioner
was held in Virginia, the warden's authority to detain the petitioner
is twofold. The custody requirement of section 2241 (c) (3) is met
by the assertion that the warden's authority to hold a prisoner
against whom a detainer has been filed stems from the Virginia
74
The
commitment as well as from the North Carolina detainer.
held
is
petitioner
the
extent
the
to
that
court further reasoned
under the detainer, the warden is acting for North Carolina and
for all practical purposes and in the context of an attack upon
the detainer, the petitioner is in the custody of North Carolina
and therefore, the proper official to 75name as respondent would
be North Carolina's Attorney General.
Once the Fourth Circuit handled the proper respondent obstacle,
70. Id. at 361-62.
71. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
72. 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969).
73. See discussion intra.
74. Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352
75. Id. at 357.

(4th Cir. 1969).

NoTE
it evaluated the alternatives for each forum and found that the
proper forum to file the petition would be the district court in
the sentencing state. Recognizing that both the sentencing state
and the state of confinement afford appropriate forums, the court
felt that any petition in the confining court would result in less
than complete relief. If the foreign state does not defend voluntarily
and the court is unable to obtain jurisdiction over the proper authorities, the district court in the confining state would be reluctant
to entertain a hearing with only the confining authority at hand. 76
At best, the court felt that a district court could only proceed
against the warden and direct the warden to give no effect to
the detainer.7 7 If petitioner is attempting to avoid the future sentence
altogether, such relief is only limited. The court did not regard
the Ahrens mandate as an obstacle to its conclusion that the action
should be brought in the district court in the sentencing state.
It noted that subsequent to Ahrens the Supreme Court had affirmed
the issuance of the writ in several cases where petitioner was
not present in the district where the writ was sought.78 The Word
court thus felt that the physical presence of the petitioner within
the district was not an invariable jurisdictional requirement and
that the Ahrens meaning given to the words "within their respective
jurisdiction" in 28 U.S.C. §2241 (a) must give way to other considerations of fairness and strong convenience.7 9 The court also
relied upon the enactment of 28 U.S.C. §2255 as evidence of congressional reaction to similar problems with respect to federal
prisoners and forecast that because of the good experience under
section 2255 Congress would respond similarly with respect to state
prisoners. 0
In summary, the Word court reasoned that subsequent cases
and legislation stands for the proposition that the location of the
petitioner is not determinative where departure from Ahrens is
compelled by administration of justice.
B. A federal prisoner petitioning for habeas corpus for collateral attack on out-of-state detainer an future sentence.
In United States Ex Rel. Meadows v. New York,"1 Meadows
was convicted for petit larceny, assault and three counts of robbery
in County Court of Suffolk County, New York, and received a
10-20 year sentence in 1958. His leave to appeal was denied. Meadows
76. Id.
77. Id. at n. 6.
(outside the boundaries of United
78. Hirota v. MacArthur, 38 U.S. 197 (1948)
States) ; Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961) (outside district); Jones v. Cun.
ningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (leaving district after proceedings begun).
79. 406 F.2d at 359.
80. Id. at 360.
81. 426 F.2d 1176 (2nd Cir. 1970).
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was paroled in 1965 after serving 8 years of his sentence. In 1966,
the New York State Board of Parole filed a parole detainer with
the federal authorities after his involvment in two bank robberies.
In June, 1967, Meadows entered a plea of guilty to two charges
of bank robbery in Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of New York and received two concurrent 14-year sentences and
is serving these sentences in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta,
Georgia. In October, 1968, Meadows petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
the confinement district, challenging the parole detainer and New
York sentence of the County Court of Suffolk County. The petition
was transferred to the Eastern District of New York, the federal
district within which Meadows' state trial took place. Relief was
denied on grounds that Meadows was not in custody under the
State conviction and failure to exhaust State court remedies. Affirming on other grounds, the Second Circuit held that the district
court of the district within which petitioner had been sentenced
82
had jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition.
After dispensing with the exhaustion issue,8 3 the Second Circuit
easily handled the custody issue by citing for the proposition that
a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is "in custody" under
any one of them for the purposes of Section 2241 (c) (3) .14 The
Meadows' court discarded any distinction between consecutive sentences being imposed by either the same or by different jurisdictions without any resort to a fiction as in Word. The court felt
prompt adjudication was compelling in either situation and that
the parole detainer had sufficient effect on custody to render the
remedy of habeas corpus available. 5 The court then faced
the jurisdiction issue since jurisdiction over the appeal depended
upon the jurisdiction of the district court below.
The precise issue was whether the District Court in the Eastern
District of New York, the sentencing district, had jurisdiction over
Meadows' collateral attack on a New York conviction, despite
Meadows' present confinement in the State of Georgia. The Second
Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction.8 6
In arriving at the decision, the Meadows court reasoned that
while the Ahrens decision was presented in general terms and
appeared to apply to all petitioners, there was no need for the
Ahrens court to speak of any specific limitation. 87 Further, at
82. Id. at 1179.
83. Id. The court was of the view that because Meadows had Presented all his constitutional claims in a writ of error coram novis and had appealed the denial of the motion,
he had exhausted all available state remedies.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1181.
87. Id.

NoTm
that time, McNally controlled and the only class of petitioners
that existed were those that could employ the writ to challenge
a present restraint. Thus, despite the general terms, Ahrens could
only apply to that class of petitioner that existed at that time.88
Since the Supreme Court had overruled McNally in Peyton, a new
class of habeas corpus petitioners had emerged, such as Meadows,
seeking to challenge a restraint to be imposed at a later date
by another jurisdiction.
The issue then before the Second Circuit in deciding Meadows
was whether to extend Ahrens to the new class of petitioners.
The court noted that the Ahrens court had based its decision in
part on a broad consideration of policy, namely, the risk and
expense of transporting prisoners long distances to appear in the
sentencing court, but that three years later in Haymen, the risk
"did not loom as large" to the Supreme Court when it was considering the Section 2255 proceeding as a form of habeas corpus proceeding.8 9 The Meadows court seized upon the Supreme Court's
use of considerations in favor of the sentencing court in Section
2255 proceedings to bolster its argument not to extend Ahrens,
e.g.: (1) the records and witnesses are located in the sentencing
state, (2) to require prisoners to proceed in the district of confinement would emasculate Peyton and (3) that jurisdiction confined
to the district of confinement also prejudices the respondent for
it is the sentencing state that is interested in the challenge to
its conviction and sentence. 90
The Court also alluded to enactments of 28 U.S.C. § 2255
and 28 U.S.C. §2241 (d) as determinative of congressional intent
in favor of the sentencing state. 91
Based on the foregoing balance in favor of the sentencing court,
the Meadows court did not consider it advisable to extend Ahrens
to this case. 92 However, the Court stated that the district of confinement retained concurrent jurisdiction and where the petitioner challenges the present prejudicial effects of a detainer that such a
district might be the proper forum.9 8 Finally, the district court in the
district of confinement could use 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) and §1406(a),
venue, to transfer the petition for habeas corpus filed therewith
to the district court in the sentencing state "in the interests of
justice." 94
88. Id
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1182, n. 3. Section 2255 provides that the appropriate forum
of conviction; Section 2241 (d) provides for interstate transfer; in addition,
"rThe Judicial districts with federal penitentiaries within their boundaries
required to consider and decide all collateral attacks on out-of-state parole
92. 426 F.2d at 1183.
98. Id. at n. 8.
94. Id, at a. 9.

is the district
note 8 states:
should not be
detainers."
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C. A state prisoner petitioning for writ of habeas corpus for
collateral attack on present impact of out-of-state detainer.
In Nelson v. George,95 George was convicted on a plea of
guilty in a California court of first degree robbery in 1964. At
the same time, a detainer was filed by North Carolina. While
serving his 5-year sentence at San Quentin, he was released to
North Carolina authorities to stand trial, was convicted and sentenced in 1967 to imprisonment of 12 to 15 years and returned
to California to complete his sentence. In April 1967, North Carolina
filed another detainer with San Quentin. George subsequently filed
a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California to attack his North Carolina
conviction. The District Court in March, 1968 denied the application
relying upon McNally. George petitioned for rehearing arguing that
the detainer affected his custodial classification and his probability
of parole. The District Court denied the petition for rehearing and
George appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
During the interim the Supreme Court decided Peyton. The Court
of Appeals held that the District Court had jurisdiction to consider
the impact of the detainer. 6
The Supreme Court affirmed, 97 holding that the District Court
had jurisdiction to consider George's petition only after he exhausted
his remedies in the California courts. Petitioner was challenging
the present effect of the detainer on the custody given by the
California authorities. The Court noted that since the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution does not require
California to enforce the detainer in any way until the obligation
to extradite matures, California should be able to consider what
present effect will be given to the detainer in relation to the
petitioner's present custody, if any. As such George had not
met the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies in California
courts.

98

The Court did not have to meet the territorial jurisdiction issue
as presented in Word and Meadows. The Court recognized the
problem, however, via dicta, 99 and reserved judgment to reconsider
Ahrens in light of changed circumstances brought about by Peyton.
More significantly, the Supreme Court noted that while federal
prisoners may challenge in the federal court of conviction because
95. Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970).
96. George v. Nelson, 410 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1969).
97. 899 U.S. 224 (1970).
98. Id. at 229, n. 6. The exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) is set forth
in the appendix. If George again challenges his North Carolina conviction but in the district of conviction in North Carolina, he would at least be in a circuit that embraces the
sentencing court as the proper forum, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969).
99. 399 U.S. at 228, n. 5-
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of 28 U.S.C. §2255, the federal statutory scheme does not afford
state prisoners that remedy in reference to the multi-state problem. 0 0°
The Court concluded:
"The obvious, logical and practical solution is an amendment to Section 2241 to remedy the shortcoming which has
become apparent following the holding in Peyton v. Rowe.
Sound judicial administration calls for such an amendment."10
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in George calls for an amendment to Section
2241. It is clear that such revision is needed. However, with emphasis
directed at legislative amendment, does the Court suggest the lower
courts wait for Congress to act? If the Supreme Court in Peyton
had interpreted congressional intent correctly, it would seem that
by necessity a new interpretation of Ahrens and Section 2241 would
be logical and intended by Congress. If such interpretation involves
a vague, ambiguous phrase which "in their respective jurisdiction"
arguably is, it would be appropriate for the court to expand jurisdiction judicially. The courts need not wait for Congress. It would
appear that district courts in the district of conviction could claim
jurisdiction of applications for writ of habeas corpus in such cases
as Word and Meadows by such interpretation of Ahrens in light
of Peyton.
Essentially, as the writ of habeas corpus has evolved, the purpose has been to provide efficient, swift post-conviction review
of allegedly unconstitutional detention. If the courts are faced with
a situation that would in essence abrogate the purpose of the
writ by leaving one in prison without a remedy, the court may
properly disregard certain habeas corpus doctrines unresponsive
to the needs of the law in its present state of development and
thereby continue the integrity and vitality of the 'Great Writ' as
the guardian of individual liberty.
That is exactly what the courts have done in Word and Meadows
and it would seem that until Congress amends Section 2241, every
100. While the Court makes reference to only state prisoners, It by necessity includes
both state and federal prisoners who challenge future state convictions. One must keep
in mind that when a federal prisoner challenges an unserved out-of-state sentence he
challenges as a state prisoner and must use habeas corpus. Section 2255 applies only to
federal prisoners serving under federal sentences.

101.

399 U.S. at 228, n. 5. Such an amendment to Section 2241 might read as Section

2241(e) (modeled after § 2241(d):
Where an application for writ of habeas corpus is made by a person In custody under Judgment and sentence of one State court or a Federal District
Court but where the person seeks to challenge a judgment and future sentence of an out-of-state court, the application may be filed in the federal
district court for the district within which the out-of-state court was held
which convicted and sentenced him.

536

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

petitioner as discussed herein would be able to achieve complete
relief with habeas corpus petitions in Federal District Courts in
the district of conviction.
BARRY T. OLSON
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APPENDIX
1. The Suspension Clause.
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 2:
The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.
2. The Habeas Corpus Provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73, 81-82).
SEC. 14. And be it further enacted. That all the before-mentioned courts
of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas
corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may
be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable
to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme
court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs
of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause -of commitment.Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners
in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority
of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the
same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
3. The Act of 1867 (14 Stat. 385).
CHAP. XXVII.-An Act amendatory of "An Act to amend an Act entitled
'An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating judicial Proceedings in certain
Cases,' " approved May eleventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-six.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever in any suit or prosecution which has been or may be commenced in any State court, and which
the defendant is authorized to have removed from said court to the circuit
court of the United States, under and by virtue of the provisions of "An
act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain
cases," approved March third, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and all the
acts necessary for the removal of said cause to the circuit court shall have
been performed, and the defendant in any suit shall be in actual custody
on process issued by said State court, it shall be the duty of the clerk of
the said circuit court of the United States to issue a writ of habeas corpus cum
causa; and it shall be the duty of the marshal, by virtue of the said writ of habeas
corpus, to take the body of the defendant into his custody to be dealt with in
said circuit court according to rules of law, and the orders of the said court,
or of any judge thereof in vacation; and he shall file a duplicate copy of said
writ of habeas corpus with the clerk of the State court in which said suit was
commenced, or deliver said duplicate to the clerk of said court; and nll attachments made, and all bail and other security given in any suit or prosecution
which has been or shall be removed from any State court to the circuit court
of the United States, in pursuance of -law, shall be and continue in like force
and effect as if the same suit -had proceeded to final judgmentt and execution
in the State court.
4. FEDERAL STATUTES, 28 U.S.C. (1964)
§2241. Power to grant writ.
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shaill be entered in the records
of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may
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decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer
the application for a hearing and determination to the district court having
jurisdiction to entertain it.
(c)

The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2)

He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act
of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or
judge of the United States; or

(3)

He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States; or

(4)

He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in
custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title,
authority, privilege, protection,, or exemption claimed under the
commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color
thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of
nations; or

(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
(d) Where ,an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person
in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which
contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed
in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or
in the district court for the district within which the State court was held
which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the.
district wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and
in furtherance of justice may transfer the application to the other district
court for hearing land determination . . .
§2254.

State custody; remedies in Federal courts.

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State
corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he
has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure,.
the question presented . . .
§2255.

Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence.

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was
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in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which imposed the subject to vacate, set aside
or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof
to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise
open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement
of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable
to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and
shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct
the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive
motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered
on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief,
by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied
him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
§1404.

Change of venue.

(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit
or proceeding of a civil nature of any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to
any other division in the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem brought
by or on behalf of the United States may be transferred under this section
without the consent of the United States where all other parties request transfer.
(c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place
within the division in which it is pending.
(d) As used in this section, "district court" includes the United States
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone; and "district" includes the
territorial jurisdiction of the court ....
§1406.

Cure or waiver of defcts.

(a) The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue
in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest
of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court
of any matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient
objection to the venue.
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(c) If a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is filed
in a district court, the district court shall, if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to the Court of Claims, where the case shall proceed as if
it had been filed in the Court of Claims on the date it was filed in the
district court.
(d) As used in this section, "district court"
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone;
territorial jurisdiction of that court ....

includes the United States
and "district" includes the

